TRADE SECRETS and COPYRIGHT claims - Dice v. Bold (6th Cir.)

Dice fails to explain how this information, even if uniquely coded, is a trade secret. The ALSCHART is a compilation of labelling codes created by manufacturers, not Dice. The codes were collected by Dice's customers, not Dice. Dice has not put forward an explanation of how the value of its unique labelling is derived from it not being readily ascertainable by proper means. And Dice has not produced any evidence to that effect. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 450.1902(d); see alsoDaimler–Chrysler, 289 F. App'x at 922 (plaintiff bears the burden to produce sufficient evidence to suggest that information derives independent economic value secrecy); Utilase, Inc. v. Williamson, 188 F.3d 510, 1999 WL 717969, at *6 (6th Cir. Sept.10, 1999) (plaintiff must identify trade secret with specificity); Dura Global Techs., Inc. v. Magna Donnelly Corp., 662 F.Supp.2d 855, 859 (E.D.Mich.2009) (same).

In addition, Dice failed to present competent evidence of misappropriation to the district court. Noting the fact that Dice did not cite any record evidence, the district court granted Bold's well-supported motion for summary judgment. Dice, for the first time on appeal, cites record evidence that it claims supports a finding of misappropriation. We do not, however, “entertain on appeal factual recitations not presented to the district court any more readily than [we] will tolerate attempts to enlarge the record itself.” Guarino, 980 F.2d at 404. The district court did not err in rejecting Dice's conclusory allegations of misappropriation in the face of competent evidence to the contrary. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

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Dice also argues that its software is a trade secret. Specifically, Dice claims that Bold misappropriated its receiver drivers that take incoming signals and convert the data to Dice's standard.

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as discussed above, Dice failed to present competent evidence of misappropriation to the district court. Second, much like the ALSCHART claim, Dice has never put forward any evidence, let alone make the argument, that its receiver drivers are actually a trade secret. Other than a generalized explanation of what the receiver drivers do, Dice has failed to explain whether the receiver drivers derive economic value from their secrecy.

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Dice alleges that to undertake the extraction process, Bold created an unauthorized derivative work in violation of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).

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We do not decide whether late registration can cure this non-jurisdictional defect. See Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 365 (5th Cir.2004),abrogated by Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 157. Dice's claim fails for a separate reason. Not all copying amounts to copyright infringement. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991). Allowing that registration constitutes prima facie evidence of the copyright's validity, see 17 U.S.C. § 410(c)4, the plaintiff must still prove “that the defendant copied protectable elements of the work.” Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 534 (6th Cir.F 2004); see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 361. Only original material is subject to copyright protection and, even then, elements of a computer program dictated by practical realities may not be protectable. SeeLexmark, 387 F.3d at 535.

Dice has not attempted to demonstrate which aspects of its programs were protectable. Dice does not identify any original elements in its software and does not argue that the receiver drivers represent non-functional expression. ....

Dice Corp. v. Bold Technologies, 12-2513, 2014 WL 260094 (6th Cir. Jan. 24, 2014)