COPYRIGHTS - Brownstein v. Lindsay (3d Cir.)

Brownstein v. Lindsay, 12-2506, 2014 WL 306240 (3d Cir. Jan. 29, 2014)

The contested work is a computer program that implements rules for identifying the ethnicity of proper names for the purposes of direct marketing. In addition to a declaration of his joint authorship, Brownstein sought an accounting of the profits from the ethnic identification system.

This appeal presents two issues of first impression for our Circuit. The first is when a joint authorship claim under the Copyright Act arises and accrues and the second is whether courts have the authority to cancel copyright registrations. For the following reasons, we hold that an authorship claim arises and accrues when a plaintiff's authorship has been “expressly repudiated”. We also hold that courts have no authority to cancel copyright registrations. 

More on the second holding:

All actions of the Copyright Office are subject to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and the judicial review attendant to the APA. 17 U.S.C. § 701(e) (“Except as provided by section 706(b) and the regulations issued thereunder, all actions taken by the Register of Copyrights under this title are subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act....”). Thus, aggrieved parties may challenge an unfavorable decision by the Copyright Office in a cancellation matter by challenging its decision in court under the APA.
It also goes without saying that courts are authorized to police copyright registrations through authorship claims and infringement claims. As emphasized earlier, a registration does not secure or create a copyright, as a right, or guarantee success on the merits of a claim—it entitles an author to bring an action under the Copyright Act and serves as proof of authorship of the copyrighted work.

Finally, we are in no way holding that courts are incapable of invalidating underlying copyrights. While the two concepts are undoubtedly related,16 the distinction matters. Holding that federal courts have the authority to cancel registrations would essentially be declaring that the judicial branch has the authority to order a legislative branch agency that is not a party to the litigation to take an affirmative action. A federal court's finding that a copyright is invalid, on the other hand, is a determination of ownership which does not disturb the registration of a copyright. Courts have no authority to cancel copyright registrations because that authority resides exclusively with the Copyright Office.